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AN APPROACH TO NAVAL ARMS CONTROL

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STRATEGY AND CAMPAIGN DEPARTMENT

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An Approach to Naval Arms Control

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An Approach to Naval Arms Control

Table of Contents

Introduction.....	1
The Political Context of the 1990's.....	7
The Theory and Practice of Arms Control.....	11
What Does Moscow Want?	24
Conceptual Framework: The "Yardstick" Problem	27
The Navy, the Nation, and Arms Control.....	45
Some Proposals.....	56
Confidence Building Measures (CBMs).....	56
Table 1.....	59
Qualitative Constraints	60
Table 2.....	62
Quantitative Constraints	63
Table 3.....	65
Geographic and/or Mission Constraints	66
Table 4.....	68
Conclusions.....	70
Notes.....	73



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An Approach to Naval Arms Control

Colin S. Gray

Introduction

Ideas for arms control, as with ideas in the realm of strategy, have neither meaning nor implications outside specific historical and geostrategic contexts. To cite but one case, not wholly at random, the superior battle fleet of an insular power is a defensive instrument of grand strategy. The superior battle fleet of a continental power already preponderant on land, however, constitutes a key instrument for an offensive bid for world imperium. Similarly, international security is imperiled by state actors politically motivated to advance their interests by force; not by those who are broadly satisfied with the existing distribution of power. Strategic and arms control theories betray a tendency to undue abstraction ("Country A" and "Country B", for example). Theorists frequently neglect the importance of identity of weapon ownership, indeed of politics altogether, and propagate the old fallacy that security is menaced by arms and arms competitions, rather than by governments and their policies.

This paper brings a holistic appreciation of the problems and opportunities of arms control to the particular issue-area of proposals for naval arms control. This multi-level analysis treats what may be characterized as the policy, strategic, operational, tactical, and technological levels of concern--all with reference to national and international security.¹ Two principal purposes drive this analysis: first, to provide a conceptual framework suitable for the assessment of

naval arms control proposals, and generally to explore approaches to thinking about naval arms control; and, second, to review briefly some leading proposals for naval arms control. This paper is designed to assist in

- the identification of agreements that should or might serve U.S. interests;
- the provision of reasoned rebuttals to arms control proposals judged not to be in the best interests of the United States; and
- the development of a methodology, at least an explicit approach, of some extensive value in the appraisal of ideas on naval arms control.

This paper has no hidden agenda. It is not masquerading as an objective study of naval arms control while, really, it is: simply a thoroughgoing defense of the U.S. Navy's current attitude towards, and opinions on naval arms control; seeking to persuade the U.S. Navy, against its instincts and better judgments, to see some merit in some arms control proposals; or endeavoring rigorously to bury rather than to praise arms control, employing the naval realm as illustrative fuel for a much more general indictment.

It may be helpful here at the outset to note that broadly there are four schools of thought on the value of arms control. In summary form, those who debate arms control questions tend to adhere to one

of the following views: that (a) arms control is the last best hope of humankind; that arms control is either (b) modestly useful or (c) modestly unhelpful for national and international security; and, finally, that arms control is (d) a snare and a delusion and that its malign consequences can pose a dire threat to the Republic. For the record, this author's general stance is (c) that arms control tends to be modestly unhelpful. However, the "modestly useful" and "modestly unhelpful" schools both have some problems of evidence. To be specific, judgments on the merit, or lack thereof, in the superpower arms control record of the last quarter century may not really be judgments about arms control at all. The modest identifiable impact of arms control agreements and of the arms control process may say little about arms control, but a great deal about the character of superpower political ambition and the absolute scale of superpower armament.

A strategic nuclear arsenal endowed richly in the 12-13,000 warhead range (the United States today) should be quite fault-tolerant vis à vis arms control policy. In retrospect, it is plausible to argue that even with the much smaller nuclear arsenals of the early 1970's, the "balance of terror" was not exactly delicate.²

Incorrectly, but perhaps understandably, it was believed in the immediate aftermath of World War I that the great Anglo-German naval race had contributed significantly to the onset of the war.³ Sir Edward Grey, Britain's Foreign Secretary early in the war--and indeed a figure critical to the British cabinet's decision at the beginning of August

1914 to intervene on the continent--played a non-trivial role in popularizing the myth that the pre-1914 arms race(s) made the war inevitable. With good intentions and fragile theories that have ample counterparts today, the politicians of the Western democracies expended great effort in the 1920's--and well into the 1930's--endeavoring to slay, or at least to subdue, the arms race dragon. Notwithstanding the extensive and abortive efforts in the early 1930's to control land armaments by formal agreement (and to ignore the Versailles régime), the centerpiece of arms control activity in the interwar years was the naval area.

The attention devoted in the 1920's and 1930's to naval disarmament--with primary (though certainly not exclusive) focus upon the capital assets that could stand in the line of battle--has long been superseded by focus upon the new "strategic" instrument of central nuclear systems. For reasons good and bad, proposals for the control of naval forces have attracted relatively little interest of recent decades. That situation of benign neglect may now be changing. The semi-organized Western arms control community, functioning Greek Chorus-like to a Soviet lead in assertion of the alleged timeliness of naval arms control, needs to be treated with unusual caution on this subject.

Strategic nuclear arms and the SIOP-RISOP "exchanges" in which they might indulge, not win, plausibly can be presented as a world apart, likely to produce independently decisive action. Such a view is wrong, but at least it has a common sense appeal. Hence,

debates over strategic arms control, as with debates over (SIOP-level) central nuclear "strategy," appear to have an integrity all their own. Strategy, even war, reduces to expert analysis of the central "exchange."

In apparently sharp contrast to the central nuclear world just described, the naval realm is bereft of the power of independent decision. This has almost always been true, but many politicians and commentators did not understand it.⁴ It follows, necessarily, that naval arms control has to be a subject that lacks integrity in and of itself. Navies contribute to the course and outcome of war waged in four geographical environments--with the addition of the near wild card of central nuclear systems. It may, arguably, make some sense to treat central nuclear systems as a class of weapons apart, suitable for isolated arms control surgery. But, no one who has devoted more than the most minimal of attention to the matter can possibly argue that the naval world lends itself to non-holistic treatment on a topic, or set of topics, apart from the total strategic context.

Points to note at this early juncture must include the following:

- To date, little contemporary attention has been paid to issues of naval arms control.
- Paradoxically, naval subjects are both better and less well comprehended than are central strategic issues. No one truly is expert on the subject of nuclear strategy and nuclear war, but theorists forget that fact--in part

because there are no uniformed experts on these subjects either. Also, historical experience has yet to confirm or deny anybody's favorite theory of nuclear strategy. By way of contrast, there is an abundance of genuine, naval expert-practitioners. These naval experts, however, tend to be expert in ship, task-force, or even in fleet operations, not in the uses of seapower against a great continental empire. When Britain's Great War with (revolutionary) France began in 1793, the Royal Navy was well manned with persons deeply experienced in fighting the French. As Carl von Clausewitz noted:⁵ that experience is also valuable as a predictor if one has fought a succession of wars with the same country, with the same geographical terms of reference, and with a barely changing technology.

- The U.S. defense community is dominated by sub-communities from issue to issue. As noted, it may be possible to isolate so-called strategic forces as an arms control field as has been done to date--witness SALT's I and II, and the candidate START treaty. Yet, there is no argument over the proposition that in war "the seat of purpose is on land."⁶ Ergo, it would be remarkable indeed if questions of naval arms control could be treated in isolation from territorial referents.

- The proper roles of naval forces in national and coalition military strategy are not very well understood. Many of the contributors to the 1980's debate on maritime strategy revealed an apparent immaturity of grasp of the role of the sea in modern war (resting, in some cases, upon poor historical understanding), which does not bode well for the quality of future debate over naval arms control. A person who cannot demonstrate a real grasp of the strategic roles of navies amidst the complexity of war in four environments, is unlikely to be able to propose anything very sensible on the subject of naval arms control. Strategic understanding should precede attempts at control: otherwise, how can one know what one is doing?

These points are not inherently hostile to the idea of, let alone to any specific proposals for, naval arms control. They do, however, suggest that naval arms control should not be treated as a subject apart, suitable for discrete and isolated attention. If navies have strategic meaning only with reference to deterrence and war as a whole, then their potential reshaping by arms control can have strategic integrity only with reference to a wider setting.

The Political Context of the 1990's

It is perhaps paradoxical that the political conditions that render negotiated arms control feasible tend also to render it a subject

of less than the most pressing importance. One should recall that the founding texts of arms control theory were particularly proud of the boldness of the conception of limited cooperation between enemies.⁷ If those enemies cease to define themselves as such, a great deal--and just possibly all--of the value of an arms control process evaporates. The eased political relations that make arms control agreement possible, also make agreement less important. The classic texts on the subject neglected to treat this political dimension.

As a matter of historical record as well as common sense, the international security world of Soviet-American relations does not offer a stark binary choice between arms race or arms control agreement. In practice, each superpower exercises financial controls over the quantitative and qualitative elements of its force posture, and shapes that posture according to criteria by no means antithetical to the objectives of arms control. Whether or not the 1990's see a flurry of formal arms control agreements, the superpower arms competition assuredly will be controlled: by resource constraints; probably by a diminishing sense of threat; and by the conscious tailoring of modernization decisions to fit criteria compatible with arms control goals (e.g., survivable force deployments).

As recent, indeed continuing, events in the internal political life of NATO make abundantly plain, the United States is not at liberty to decline to have a positive attitude and policy towards a formal interstate arms control process. The consequences of that process for defense modernization are eminently arguable. At one extreme there

are those who claim that the anticipation or the actuality of formal arms control has a "lulling" effect upon a Western democracy. On the other extreme there are those who would put arms control in the dock to answer the charge that it legitimizes defense modernization. Suffice it to say that an ongoing formal arms control process, or the imminent reality of such, has been proven to provide powerful arguments against limited measures of unilateral disarmament.⁸ After all, why should the adversary agree to pay a price for benefits that accrue anyway? To date, public awareness of the possibilities in the realm of naval arms control---benign and malign possibilities--has yet to attain a critical mass vis à vis naval modernization arguments. Thus far, with one lonely, if major exception, people are arguing neither that contentious Navy developments should be aborted or slowed down because they would imperil an arms control process, nor that those contentious Navy developments must be supported because success or failure in an arms control process depends thereon. The exception is of course the sea-launched cruise missile (SLCM). The maturity of the debate over SLCM, however, is a reflection of the maturity of the debate over strategic arms control--it may not be a harbinger of a debate to come on naval arms control.

Overwhelmingly, SLCM is approached as a contributor to the deterrence of, or to performance in, central and regional war. SLCM and the associated problems of arms control has not been treated very extensively as a flexible capability for global naval power. A great deal of the public commentary pro and con on the control of SLCM's has

been uttered by people not known to be expert on maritime strategy and the roles of navies in crisis and war.

At this early juncture, the discussion will not spare time on speculating over the character of Soviet motives behind their current arms control offensive. Purposefully, one must presume, Mr. Gorbachev is waging war in peace against both the political cohesion of the Western Alliance and against the political willingness of its individual members to modernize their military establishments. Above all else, Moscow is campaigning for the maximum feasible measure of denuclearization of NATO in Europe.⁹ This campaign is certainly erosive of NATO's extant strategy of flexible response, but it is not so clear that the West could not benefit in the long run from a functionally increasingly "post nuclear era."¹⁰ Just as it makes no sense to consider arms control proposals divorced from the goals of strategic planning, so it would be foolish to approach the problems and opportunities presented by future conflict at sea outside the context of trends in net combat prowess in the other geographical environments.

The United States can commit itself sincerely to the goals of arms control without feeling obliged to endorse any particular arms control process or proposal for formal agreement. History suggests not only that arms control begins at home, but also that unilateral defense behavior--sometimes reciprocated, sometimes not--is the realm of real arms control progress.¹¹

The Theory and Practice of Arms Control

The beginning of wisdom in arms control, as in all things, is self-knowledge. As a polity, the United States has proven itself to be systemically inclined to perform in the arms control connection according to a pattern of beliefs, attitudes, and procedures described briefly in the paragraphs that follow. These American characteristics warrant ascription as cultural, since they comprise socially transmitted, learned, patterns of thought and behavior.¹²

First, in keeping with the social ideology of the New World, novelty has a social and political value for its freshness of form irrespective of its content. If the reports are to be believed, some of President Bush's most senior advisors recommended that he outbid Mikhail Gorbachev with proposals for troop cuts very much more radical in their provisions for American withdrawals than the JCS were to find prudent.¹³ In American political culture familiarity can breed boredom, contempt, and charges of a lack of energy and vision. For example, whether or not Soviet leaders expect the United States ever to negotiate on naval arms control topics, they know full well that a democracy--unless led by a Margaret Thatcher with a very large parliamentary majority--cannot "just say no" for very long in the context of a political climate apparently permissive of agreement.

Second, American society, reflecting its domestic experience, is prone to look to "technical fixes"--to technological solutions to problems of external security.¹⁴ For example, the large residual doubts that will accompany the negotiation of a CFE treaty, predictably

will be assuaged with the promise, or aspiration for, clock-round and all-weather emerging technologies arguably capable of buying time for NATO mobilization and forward deployment. The START negotiations similarly will be backstopped by claims for the "hedge" value of the U.S. high technology base in offensive and defensive weapons, and in support systems.

Third, it is very much the American way in national security policy to live with, and work around, a more or less chronic disconnection between military strategy and arms control policy. It can hardly have escaped public notice that, with respect to CFE for example, arms control policy is way out ahead of strategy, while grand strategy floats somewhere between the two. It is understandable and necessary to ask what the adversary-partner's CFE (or INF, or START) proposal appears to imply for the military balance and hence for the likely viability of this or that military strategy. It is much less understandable, and it should not be necessary, for the U.S. Government to pose strategy questions after a treaty has been signed and ratified (INF), after its politician-diplomats have identified politically attractive positions (CFE), and after the framework of a treaty--albeit with a thousand brackets (i.e., disagreements or requirements for clarification)--has been negotiated (START).

Fourth, it is an open secret that the United States does not have a sanctions--or other--policy to cope with Soviet non-compliance with treaty terms. It is a less open secret that this deficiency is as culturally grounded as the Soviet propensity to cheat. Indeed, these

two cultural characteristics function in malign synergism, since manifest U.S. acquiescence in Soviet cheating diminishes or removes Soviet incentives to combat their cultural inclinations. It cannot be politically healthy in a democracy for a small body of cognoscenti to pretend that arms control verification and compliance are important subjects, all the while knowing that the public posturing on the subject is little more than a charade. Some leading conservatives are guilty of cynical misuse of the verification issue for the real purpose of the preemptive discrediting of unwelcome arms control proposals. Some leading liberals are guilty of having great difficulty finding any instance of Soviet misbehavior for which they could not invent some half-way plausible excuse. For example, a leading Sovietologist of the liberal persuasion explained away Krasnoyarsk radar as simply a case of the left hand of Soviet bureaucracy not knowing what the right hand was up to.

Fifth, in addition to the persisting U.S. difficulty is constructing robust bridges between military strategy and arms control policy, there is a non-trivial U.S. history of lack of rigor in the design of strategy. Obviously, one cannot provide strategic guidance for arms control if "strategy" comprises but the stapled together wishes of the services and the "fighting CINCs," heavily modified by the deeply political outcomes of the defense budgetary process. In other words, if U.S., or NATO, military strategy has poor integrity as strategy, it may be unjust to level charges of incoherence or indifference to strategic principles in arms control.

Sixth, the United States has a long history of performing inadequately in the mechanics, or dynamics, of the negotiating process. This is not because U.S. society fails to produce skilled negotiators or neglects to reward competence in negotiation. Rather, the U.S. Government often behaves as if it believes that arms control negotiations are simply external examples of a familiar domestic phenomenon. Moreover, because arms control negotiations and outcomes have intrinsic value to Western societies, U.S. political leaders are prone to discount general wisdom on how to/how not to negotiate.¹⁵ After all, how did the Soviets drive the SS-19 through the SALT I agreement? How did they secure the counting in SALT II of inoperable B-52's but not of operational, and refuelable, Backfire's? How could the United States agree to a double-zero INF treaty which must yield a German NATO ally jumping ship from Alliance strategy? These few examples hardly exhaust the list.

Six points do not offer as proof positive of the threat American society allows arms control to pose to national security. Instead, the argument is that the United States and its allies should negotiate arms control agreements, if they must, that are highly fault tolerant in the areas just cited.

A country's approach to arms control, and to strategy more broadly, is shaped by its political and strategic culture. Whether arms control is viewed naively as the golden path to a heavily technological peace (a leading American phenomenon), cynically as a form of theater for the influencing of gullible Westerners (a characteristically Leninist

view), or an instrument for the facilitation of genuinely useful limited cooperation, it is applied by--and is an expression of the purposes of-- particular national security communities. Arms control is an important arrow in the Soviet quiver of "competitive strategies." Notwithstanding the fact that times appear to be changing in the U.S.S.R., Soviet leaders retain a structural advantage over the leaders of open pluralistic democracies in the public theater of arms control. A Soviet leader does not have to be reasonable, consistent, or honest in his statements on arms control; a U.S. leader has considerably less freedom of action. This is not to prejudge whither the U.S.S.R. is tending in its domestic evolution, but only to claim that the Soviet Government, to date, enjoys a politically relatively permissive domestic setting for the design and articulation of arms control policy--or of other policy masquerading as arms control.

Western policymakers and publics are not schooled in dialectical thinking--that is, in the world of "both/and" rather than "either-or." The Soviet adversary/partner for arms control may be facing a very pressing domestic need to reduce military forces, and the political leadership may judge that the great institution of state that is the Army can be brought to acquiesce in such reductions only in the context of a reliable down-scaling of the (nominal) threat from the West. As is predictable already with reference to Soviet strategic force modernization and START, however, the Soviet Union seeks both to reduce forces and to maximize the prospects of achievement of a more favorable military balance through a reductions process. This is not a

criticism. Since the military profession could be charged at any time with the operational mission of defending the state and its survival interests in war, it is only sensible in an uncertain world to be well prepared to fight. It is not necessarily a cynical manipulation of people's hopes to design an arms reductions regime in such a way that the military balance improves.

Mikhail Gorbachev has written and spoken about the importance of the rule of law in the Soviet Union.¹⁶ The facts remain that, again to date, the Soviet Union has acted as a thoroughly lawless state, save in the Byzantine sense that the will of the state is the law. Soviet international behavior and misbehavior fully has matched its domestic character, with the critical qualification that whereas Soviet statecraft has been constrained by the countervailing strength of other polities, Soviet citizens have had to exist subject to a state power that has been constrained only by consideration of its own convenience. Recent, indeed current, events in the People's Republic of China should serve to underline the point that apparently irreversible ascents to the sunlit uplands of ever more popular sovereignty, are nothing of the sort. Communist regimes, like great continental empires--particularly if they are great continental empires--do not purposefully oversee their own demise. The popular idea that an arms control framework can provide a useful measure of predictability is not wholly without merit.¹⁷ That idea needs to be qualified, however, with the counsels of prudence that point to the cultural nature of Soviet proclivities to comply only selectively with arms control obligations, and to the

possibility of quite radical discontinuities in the course of state policies.

Finally in this brief commentary on matters Soviet, it is probably useful to recognize that Moscow does not really have what can be termed an arms control policy, at least not in the sense in which Western governments and experts discuss that subject. Christopher Donnelly has written persuasively that a

...stable long-term perspective is very evident in Soviet national strategy and national planning. It is not simply a function of an ideological approach, nor of the natural stability and resistance to change to be found in a totalitarian society. Although these factors reinforce the attitude, there is an innate Russian ability to see the "big picture" and to subordinate short-term needs to long-term goals...¹⁸

It should not be forgotten that Lenin found great value in Clausewitz's writings precisely because of their insistence upon the subordination of military activity to political goals. Soviet arms control behavior is an expression, and not a transcending, of Soviet grand strategy. High U.S. officials proclaim the essential unity of defense planning and arms control proposals; Soviet officials practice that unity. The theory of arms control has been more often intoned solemnly than very carefully reconsidered, since first it was rather casually codified twenty years ago.¹⁹ Generally it has come to be agreed that arms control can have three very broad objectives: to reduce the risks of war; to reduce the amount, or kinds, of damage that could be suffered in war; and to reduce the burden of peacetime defense preparation. The third objective is both economic and

political in motivation, since there are theories that hold that a very heavy defense burden can manifest itself in a militarized society, a garrison state and the like, which would be inclined to seek military solutions to its security problems. Two major problems beset these three canonical objectives of arms control. The first and most important objective is not of much value as a goal in the absence of a reliable theory of war causation. Also, there can be tension among the three objectives.

The Western defense and arms control debate is abundantly populated with people holding more or less explicit theories on the causes of war. It is not a purpose of this essay to revisit the unsettled scholarly debate over why war occurs.²⁰ The question why war occurs, however, is neither inherently trivial nor is it irrelevant to an essay on the prospects for, and value of, naval arms control. By one path or another, most of the ideas for (naval) arms control are believed by their advocates to make a positive contribution to the barriers against war.

Recognizing the impractical nature of reducing the risks of war as an objective--since it is about as useful as the advice to "be good"--more operational goals appear from time to time. By way of illustration of the response to the operational problem just cited, people have argued, or asserted, that with arms control one can

- limit the spread of nuclear weapons;

- remove or reduce the risk of misunderstanding of events or accidents;
- seal off wasteful or dangerous activities;
- channel military activity into stabilizing paths; and
- reduce misunderstanding about the purposes to be served by weapon developments.

These, and similar, goals appear to be much easier to render operational than does the classical trinity of objectives. Close inspection, however, rapidly reveals unanticipated difficulties. What is a destabilizing weapon or deployment? Indeed, is there, can there be, any truly objective measure of stability? The ability of the U.S. Navy and Marine Corps--with allied assistance--to deploy far forward in the Norwegian Sea can be argued to have a stabilizing effect, a destabilizing effect, or neither. Circumstances would be critically important. Yet, when negotiators frame arms control régimes they can deal only on the basis of general propositions. The U.S. Navy might be deprived through arms control of the overall strength to be able reliably to have a Northern Flank offensive option, even though the negotiators could not possibly know whether or not such an option would ever be highly desirable. One might recall that although the Imperial Japanese Navy was constrained to the low figure in the 5:5:3 ratio for tonnage in capital ships by the Washington Treaty of 1922, her practical fleet superiority in the Western Pacific was guaranteed by the Treaty's

prohibitions against further construction of fortified fleet bases (in the Marianas or on Guam, for the leading examples).

In short, the negotiators of arms control treaties, inevitably and as with all people, make mistakes. Not only can they not foresee reliably the kinds of military capabilities that may be needed many years into the future, but existing arms control theory cannot provide much assistance in that regard. The simple (minded) solution to ban or restrict "offensive" or "destabilizing" weapons has the signal feature that, by and large, it begs the very questions in purports to resolve.

The theory of arms control, indeed all theories of arms control, rest upon some measure of belief in the proposition that arms competitions--or at least military relationships--either cause, or help shape the conditions promote war. That proposition is less than crystal clear in its terms. What is arms competition, an arms race, or even a military relationship, and do the differences among these three matter? Surely there is a world of difference between the claim that an arms race causes a war, that an arms race is among the causes of a war, or that an arms race helps shape the conditions that promote war. Some politicians and distinguished diplomatic historians believed in the immediate aftermath of World War I that "the arms race" had been a noteworthy cause of the war. So many are the claims to paternity for that war, however, that the elevation of the arms race as the villain is not self-evidently persuasive. Unfortunately for arms-race-as-villain theories, it is plausible to argue that the arms-race of the late 1930's contributed to the outbreak of war through being

waged too late and in too half-hearted a manner by the Western democracies. Compared with Hitler's ambition, the arms race as a cause of World War II barely warrants mention.

Arms competition has been an unusually prominent feature of Soviet-American relations since the late 1940's--a fact that modern arms control theory may have permitted to overwhelm common sense. The notably bipolar structure of power in postwar international politics, as the other major players languished in the ruin of defeat or were on U.S. life-support assistance even in supposed victory, naturally elevated the apparent importance of national armaments. Historically, states have competed in two leading ways: they amass armaments and they acquire allies. After 1945, alliance acquisition had its value, but it was not the stuff of which the difference between victory or defeat would likely be made. Nuclear-armed super states could not collect winning coalitions after the fashion of times past--at least, it did not seem so for many years.

Arms control theory advises implicitly that in some important sense, weapons make war. If they do not, why take the trouble to control them? In fact, the general truth is that governments, not weapons, make war, and that politicians decide to fight whether or not their military machines are truly ready. There is probably some limited value in the idea, on the other hand, that particular military concepts, force postures, and activities themselves can contribute to the prospects for war. Rather after the manner of Edward N. Luttwak's powerful exposition of "the paradoxical logic of war,"²¹ arms

control has the problem that it over-dignifies a useful insight--that weapons can promote insecurity, even for their owners--and attempts to transform it into a full-blown practical theory of peace.

The final point worth noting here on the subject of arms control theory broadly, is what may be termed the arms control paradox. Namely, the contemporary discussion of arms control ideas and policies has yet to come to grips with the seductive proposition that states or coalitions in need of arms control assistance in their strategic relations are unable to achieve such assistance for the very reasons--and roughly to the degree--that they need it. Stated very directly: if thoroughgoing measures of arms control or disarmament are negotiable, it is a near certainty that the parties are no longer in need of such measures. The future of East-West relations is always uncertain, but it is self-evident that the heroically radical arms control proposals that recently have become all-but de rigueur are a product, and in no sense a cause, of dramatically improving political relations.

The backdrop to the first period since the 1930's wherein naval arms control might seriously be considered, has to be recognition that the record of arms control, to date, has not been strongly positive for international security. It is arguable whether arms control has been modestly useful or modestly unhelpful for security, but there can be no reasonable doubt that great consequences have not flowed, and are unlikely to flow, from the arms control enterprise. Arms control is a heavily dependent, not an independent, variable in the security relations among states. One cannot know what did not happen that

would have happened--the wars that were deterred, the accidents that were prevented--as a result of the arms control process. It is difficult, however, to make a plausible case for arms control playing a leading role in the on-going drama that is international security politics. It should be noted that an implication of this point is that although arms control agreements are unlikely to accomplish important objectives for the cause of peace with security, they are also unlikely to draw countries into realms of dire peril.

To discern only a very limited potential value for arms control and to notice the modesty of its historical accomplishments, is not to be critical of the enterprise. No more should be asked of arms control than it can deliver. Inductive and deductive theory tells us that the central premise for, or insight behind, modern arms control, almost certainly is either fallacious or seriously misleading. To be specific, the early theorists of modern arms control were certainly correct to perceive the desirability of limited cooperation between adversaries (potential combatants), but they erred in discounting the practical consequences of the all-important political factor. Countries that are sliding towards war discard their legal arms control fetters (witness the fate of the inter-war naval arms control treaties, including the Anglo-German Agreement of 1935); while countries engaged in building political fences against war are likely to seek some arms control expression of that antecedent, and enabling, political reality.

By way of summary, the argument has suggested that the value of arms control agreements for security--positive or negative--is very

likely to be low, and that the arms control enterprise in all its manifestation cannot begin to realize the more expansive hopes that many people have invested in it. The problem is not arms control; it is world politics--and people who choose to remain ignorant of the bounds of the possible.

What Does Moscow Want?

The U.S. and NATO approach to naval arms control should not be driven by highly speculative analysis of Soviet motives. Instead, what is most important is for Western officials to know what is in their own minds on the subject. On the basis of Sun Tzu's wise injunction to know the enemy,²² however, and to help officials make sense of the pulse of naval arms control "proposals" that have been floated over the past several years, it is probably useful to register--while retaining an open mind--the non-exclusive range of possibilities. Six largely complementary motives recommend themselves for consideration.

First, the naval area is being addressed from Moscow (and elsewhere in the Warsaw Pact) as an integral part of a general arms control offensive. This offensive probably is designed less to yield any particular desired military outcomes--with the notable exception of progress toward's NATO-European denuclearization--than to support a political mood of greatly relaxed tension conducive to Soviet domestic economic reform. In other words, arms control in general, and in particular, is really largely a blind, a cover perhaps, for the real political and economic business of East-West relations.

Second, Moscow can seek naval arms control agreements that have the effect, whatever their superficial appearance, of cutting asymmetrically into NATO's fighting strength, on the basis of what amounts to a claim for "fair play." If the U.S.S.R. is suffering grossly asymmetrical reductions in its land power, is it not reasonable that NATO should accept some pain in its seapower? Needless to say, careful treatment of the differences in functions and capabilities between navies and armies does not characterize this seemingly reasonable appeal for some balance in asymmetries.

Third, Soviet promotion of a menu of ill-assorted naval arms control ideas--one can hardly say proposals, as yet--has considerable confusion value. Indeed, such promotion generates a certain friction that helps keep the adversary off balance. Moscow knows that although NATO is a maritime dependent coalition, its European continental elements tend to be less than thoroughly persuaded of the relative strategic value of naval forces. The absence of a sensible agreed "theory of war" on NATO's part, renders the national and inter-service issues of potential naval arms control particularly difficult to assess intelligently.

Fourth, the U.S.S.R. can hope that a NATO almost pathetically eager to witness a heroic scale of reduction in the Warsaw Pact ground forces, might well be tempted to pay part of the price of agreement in the coin of some naval capability. After all, so the argument can proceed, since Soviet tank armies cannot be halted very plausibly by Western naval power, why not be clever and negotiate as if land and

naval forces have some calculable relation to each other. Relatively few Western politicians or even defense experts have demonstrated a solid grasp of the character of maritime strategy or of the ways in which seapower functions as a strategic enabling agent. As a consequence, Soviet prospects for embarrassing NATO with reasonable sounding naval arms control ideas are by no means negligible.

Fifth, for reason of strategic geography the U.S.S.R. is obliged to accord only a low priority to naval modernization. As the Soviet economy becomes ever more marginal as the basis upon which to rest pretensions to superpower, funding for the Navy is a most attractive target for budgetary restraint. In short, the U.S.S.R. probably recognizes that it cannot afford to modernize its Navy, so--after the fashion of Britain in 1922--it seeks to make a virtue of that fact, and extract some strategic benefit through the pursuit of naval arms control.

Finally, it would be wise for U.S. officials to consider the most obvious of possible Soviet motives: a desire to reduce the war-fighting value of Western navies, and as a consequence to enhance the possibility that Soviet arms could win a non-nuclear theater operation in Europe. Soviet strategic culture is land-minded, but it may not be wholly land-fixated. It is always possible that some of the military professionals in Moscow have worried about the end game to a war with a western world led by the transoceanic United States. Bearing in mind their prospective, total geostrategic situation, Soviet military planners may well worry that Western seapower: first, could make a

modest, but critical difference in denying victory to Soviet arms in a short war; and, second, could shape the course and outcome of a long war that Moscow could not win.

Policy rarely has a single motive, any more than a great event has a single cause. On the other hand, it would probably be an error to assume that, as with much of what passes for U.S. arms control policy, Soviet motives in advancing ideas for naval arms control are inchoate, rather casual, poorly interrelated, and generally ephemeral. The U.S.S.R. is fully capable of policy error and policy confusion, but their arms control ideas have an impressive record of complementarity with political and defense planning goals.

Conceptual Framework: The "Yardstick" Problem

Many senior officials long have pretended, and perhaps some actually have believed, that a correct, a sufficient, defense posture could be calculated. Similarly, it has been popular to endorse the idea that some objective "yardstick" could pass unarguable judgment upon the merit of a proposed arms control regime. Unfortunately, questions of defense--including arms control--do not reduce usefully and essentially to applied mathematics, engineering, economics, administration, or philosophy. Instead, political judgment is required in the face of uncertainties far beyond the scope of the mathematical theory of games to illuminate. Stated very simply, the question of interest here is: How can one distinguish an attractive (naval) arms control proposal from an unattractive one? The general public might be excused for believing that "defense experts" have access to some

arcane method that enables them to test the latest arms control idea or proposal for its value. Alas, nothing could be farther from the truth. Strategy is an art, not a science, and so is policy judgment over the merit of candidate arms control regimes.

In theory it should be possible to design a conceptual framework for the testing of an arms control idea, but in practice such a framework can be only of limited merit because it is no better than the debatable strategic and political ideas of which it must be comprised. Strategic studies, as a multidisciplinary field, has a great deal to say about the characteristics of desirable arms control regimes--much of which will not withstand close scrutiny. Strategic studies is not, and will never be an experimental science yielding testable hypotheses as the bases for Laws of Strategic Behavior. What is important is that high officials, legislators, and other opinion leaders think strategically about arms control proposals, not that they pursue the chimera of a set of objective tests of merit. A classic baby and bath water issue lurks behind this discussion. Just because there is no single all-embracing test of security merit that can be applied to INF, START, or naval arms control proposals, it does not follow that there is not a standard set of questions that should be posed to the advocates of arms control.

One cannot prove or disprove the net value in, for example, constraints on the size and geographical location of naval exercises. Nevertheless, one should be required to explain plausibly the causal connections between the constraints at issue and the objectives sought--both interim and final objectives, that is. As usual, the heart of

the problem lies in the field of strategy. It is relatively easy to focus upon the means in question (particular suggested provisions in the arms control realm), as it is also upon the ends (peace with security, honor and justice, and so forth). But, it can be exceedingly difficult to trace plausible connections between a naval arms control treaty and high-level policy desiderata. In fact, such alleged "objectives" as peace, security, honor and justice are not really objectives at all, certainly they are not objectives that can be sought directly, rather are they conditions attained via intermediate objectives. Unfortunately, disagreements over priorities among, and about the proper ways to pursue those intermediate objectives provided large disconnects between arms control means and policy ends. It should always be remembered that strategy is not about means and ends: it is about the relationship between means and ends.

No one will disagree with the advice that the United States should agree to naval arms control only if its national security objectives would be well served thereby; but what are U.S. national security objectives? Answers will differ in small detail of exposition from document to document and from year to year, but President Reagan's January 1988 listing can stand as a representative example. The U.S. arms control planner in search of high-level policy guidance is told that his country's national security objectives are to:

- maintain the security of the United States and her allies;

- respond to the challenges posed by the global economy;
- defend and advance the cause of democracy (an ideological goal of questionable relevance to U.S. national security);
- forward the peaceful resolution of disputes; and
- build effective and friendly relationships with other nations.

This might be tolerable, if unenlightening, for a junior high school civics textbook, but it is less than helpful to people who need to know what policy--or other--tests they can apply to discover the merit in a particular, candidate arms control measure. Therefore, it is with high hopes that one looks to the illustrative list of intermediate or instrumental objectives pertaining to the first "bullet" above. In order to maintain the security of the United States and her allies, we are told that there is a need to:

- deter attack on the United States and her allies, and defeat attack should it come (but, how are these worthy objectives to be pursued?);
- deal with threats short of war;
- prevent single-power or coalition domination of Europe and Asia (an excellent idea, with a distinguished history, but--again--how should this be accomplished);

- deny the transfer of critical technologies to hostile powers;
- reduce reliance on nuclear weapons (but, by how much?--and where?);
- assure unimpeded U.S. access to the oceans and to space (totally unimpeded by arms control constraints?);
- secure closer relations with the Chinese People's Republic (another excellent geostrategic idea--it is a very good idea to have a large fraction of the Soviet Army detained on the U.S.S.R.'s inner-Asian frontiers; but, U.S. ideology complicates the path to this objective);
- discourage nuclear proliferation.

"Objectives" such as the above help to provide a conceptual framework for the assessment of arms control proposals, but few--if any--of them come with operational details attached of kinds very helpful for the weighing of specific arms control ideas. If these national security objectives, at two levels, were all of the high-level guidance available, then there would be a gaping chasm between policy goals and tactics.

It is important to emphasize a point treated en passant above. Just because the objectives cited above do not lend themselves logically to unique forms of operationalization, it does not follow that

politicians and other high officials do not make what amount to technical military decisions on the basis of endorsement of variants of those objectives. For example, a U.S. President may (think that he) know(s) that an arms control agreement on conventional armed forces in Europe (CFE) will be beneficial for East-West and West-West relations. That President probably assumes that there is stability in the multi-level East-West military relationship, so he is not deeply interested in the operational and strategic implications of the pending agreement. A sensible U.S. President will reason that arms control agreements fall on a normal curve, and provided he is certain that awesome military disadvantage does not loom as a consequence of the agreement, the outcome is going to fall somewhere in the extensive modestly useful and modestly not useful categories. In short, the Republic is very unlikely to be either at risk or saved by the arms control process. If that is assumed to be the case, a President may believe that the political agenda and temper of the times should drive the arms control process, since nothing of great military (and hence probably ultimately of strategic and policy) significance will be at stake.

The three classic goals of arms control--to reduce the risk of war, to reduce the damage in war, and to reduce the peacetime burdens of defense--have considerable theoretical utility. In practice these long-hallowed goals are neither sufficiently inclusive as to be allowed to serve as the guardians of policy integrity, nor are they well enough supported with robust understanding of why and how wars begin, develop, and are terminated. It is commonplace to assert that

reduction of the risk of war is the overriding goal to be sought through arms control, but that cannot be allowed to be true. Arms control is, or should be, a particular stream of diplomatic activity as well as a consideration in defense planning. Since it cannot be the overriding goal of the United States to reduce the risk of war--a foreign policy of strict isolation probably would best serve that end in the short run--it cannot be the overriding goal of U.S. arms control activity. This is not to deny that reduction in the risk of war is a valid goal, but such risk might best be reduced as a consequence of the putative enemies of the United States believing that they would lose a war.

One has to beware of sophistry. The purpose of this discussion is not to score debating points over those who look to arms control theory to provide criteria of merit for arms control activity. Instead, the point here is simply to state that the classic goals of arms control are, and apparently were intended by their author to be, commonsense generalities. The difficulty does not lie in the merit of reducing the risk of war, but rather in deciding whether or not constraints on naval deployment, armament, and so forth, plausibly can serve that end. Arms control theory somewhat imperially has coöpted, or attempted to coöpt, the whole realm of military security, by the choice of broad general goals that can be argued to be compatible with the goals of defense policy. This sophistry produces the situation, however, where an arms control treaty should be tested for its value as a contributor towards U.S. military victory.(!) If the risks of war are reduced by adversary perception of U.S. military

strength, presumably the stronger the United States the lower should be the risks of war. Plainly, the goals of arms control should not be asked to bear our such heavy traffic.

Theory on the causes of war provides a checklist of "causes"--both underlying factors and precipitating events--much of which should lend itself to arms control attention. Mixing distant with immediate factors, anybody interested in reducing the risks of war has to be on the alert for: incompatible vital interests; perceptions of hostility; misunderstanding; miscalculation of the prospects for military success; and accidents.

Arms control, by definition, is about the symptoms of political discord, not about the discord itself. Although competitive armament cannot be assumed to be a wholly passive factor in the tenor of interstate political relations, still it has to be true that the political causes of international insecurity cannot be treated technically via arms control. Similarly, wars can be fueled by the political consequences of perceptions of hostile intent. Very often, those perceptions will be accurate. Whether they are accurate or not, it is evident that there has to be a political change, even a "sea change," before there can be a technical change in military posturing. States may well desire to express, reinforce, and accelerate, a "sea change" in diminished perceptions of hostility through an arms control process. That process is a servant, however. It cannot be the master of political perceptions of hostility.

Misunderstanding is gloriously vague as an idea and as a test of the merit in arms control. What can be said about it? First, transcultural misunderstanding is indeed deep and widespread (e.g., witness the surprise on the part of America's leading television pundits that China's Communist Party would not surrender power quietly). Second, arms control or the arms control process cannot much help to reduce misunderstanding because it is conducted by the same culture-bound individuals and institutions that conduct the rest of grand strategy. Third, even if it were true to claim that the arms control process could reduce misunderstanding, so what? How many wars, great and small, have been "caused" in some very significant sense by misunderstanding? The grand strategies, military strategies, and operational designs of states have been based on misunderstanding, but policy choices for peace or war have tended not to be.

Obviously, at least one side in every conflict miscalculates the prospects for military success. It is not at all clear, however, how an arms control regime reliably can alter that fact in a manner that is benign for international security. The willingness and ability of states to negotiate and abide strictly by agreements that ensure a reciprocal, "structural inability to attack," for example, remain to be demonstrated.

Finally, both the popular and the expert-professional literature advises states to beware of war precipitated by "accident" (typically implicitly defined as a clash by tactical units unintended by central

political authorities). The 1972 Agreement on the Prevention of Incidents on and over the High Seas, the creation of superpower risk reduction centers in national capitals, and--most recently--the conclusion of an agreement intended to facilitate direct communication between superpower tactical military units that have accidentally either clashed or intruded geographically in places held to be very sensitive by others, all express the concern over war by accident. Without denigrating the theoretical importance of this topic, one must register the point that there is no recorded case in modern history of anything even remotely resembling accidental war. In an age of ICBMs and electronic warning, it is entirely sensible for politicians and defense planners to hedge their bets, disdain the historical record of non-occurrence of accidental war, and proceed to worry about the problem of accident. Nonetheless, if one is designing, or responding to, naval arms control proposals with a view to diminishing the presumed, though of course ever incalculable, risks of accidental conflict, it may be important to have a little historical perspective on the subject.

Putting aside for the moment the causes of war as most frequently presented with reference to the alleged relevance of arms control, it may be instructive to approach the topic positively. What are the conditions for, or the correlates of, peace? Leading candidates for these conditions, or correlates, must include: the accommodation of interests; the redefinition of threat (e.g., Britain vis à vis France and Russia in the early 1900's; the United States vis à vi the PRC in the

early 1970's); the securing of greater understanding (bearing in mind the negative observations provided above); self-discipline and careful control in national diplomatic and military behavior; and the paying of adequate attention to maintenance of a balance of power. In theory, arms control should be able to play a modestly useful supporting role to assist with each of these. Still, the familiar caveats about the primacy of politics apply. Above all else, perhaps, one might observe that if states can reduce drastically the incompatibility of their interests, it may not much matter whether arms control or disarmament agreements accompany or follow that event.

If national security objectives and arms control objectives comprise barren soil for the guidance of would-be naval arms controllers, perhaps strategic analysis can suggest some criteria of a more operational kind. Six tests of the worth of a naval arms control proposal have at least some notional merit. The problem with these tests is that they beg a further series of questions. On the other hand, it is not absurd to ask of a candidate naval arms control proposal what its impact would be for:

- both general and immediate deterrence;
- net war-fighting prowess;
- the use of force on behalf of (U.S definition of) international order in situations short of war;
- alliance cohesion;

- crisis, arms race, and political stability; and for
- the domestic political/economic sustainability of adequate naval power.

It will be readily apparent that although these possible criteria obviously are appropriate, they leave so much room for argument over preferred definitions of terms, favored strategic theories, and generally for judgment of all kinds, that one is still a fair distance from having identified a conceptual framework of any real utility for policy or strategic guidance to arms control planners. This broad level of strategic analysis, even though it conceals a multitude of disagreements, by and large is the level at which "defense experts," truly functioning as "defense experts," would like to see arms control debate focus. Above this level one is in the politicians' realm of often strategically disconnected rhetoric, while below it one is in the world of Navy objectives and naval doctrine (as contrasted with maritime strategy).

Lest there be any misunderstanding, it is not suggested here that just because people disagree on what deters, on how wars which cannot be deterred should be waged, and how stability is best promoted in time of crisis (inter alia), better theories cannot be distinguished from worse theories. In other words, this paper is not at all confused over either its understanding of what these particular strategic tests imply, or of how candidate naval arms control proposals should be scored on these criteria. The troubles are that: this paper

expresses judgments with which some people may disagree; and in practice the arms control process tends to be managed according to policy guidance that is all but indifferent to strategic arguments (of any school of thought).

This is probably approximately the right juncture in the paper to draw attention, at some small risk of caricature, to the kind of questions that different individuals and institutions will ask of a proposed naval arms control treaty.

- The President will ask: Is it in the national interest/is it in my political interest? (The two questions fuse easily)
- The Chairman of the JCS will ask: What effect will it have upon the ability of the U.S. armed forces to do the jobs asked of them in peacetime and in wartime? Also he will be interested in the implications of the treaty for the balance of power among and within the great military institutions of state that he heads.
- The CNO will ask? What does it mean for the ability of the Navy to perform the missions assigned it as an institution?
- The average senator will ask if it is equal and verifiable.
- The average television talk show host will ask if it is a "good" or a "bad" treaty.

Supply and demand has a way of ruling in national security debate as well as in matters economic. If the policy making and policy executing community for U.S. national security were required for domestic political survival to perform at a high level of strategic competence in the arms control process, one should anticipate that strategic quality would indeed become "job one." A democratic polity in time of fairly deep peace, however, tends not to function very strategically, even on policy subjects that would seem to beg for strategic attention. It follows that arms control policy making in Washington, D.C., is always at risk to capture by, for sundry examples: a White House staff seeking a Nobel Prize for their boss; professional diplomats enthralled by the logic of negotiation and by momentum towards agreement; verification experts with tunnel vision; and professional nay-sayers who can always find something suitable from among their fifty-seven varieties of objection to render the prospects for agreement (within the U.S. Government, let alone with the U.S.S.R.) remote.

Arms control negotiations have a tendency toward what might be termed the triviality of the particular. In the momentum, even the excitement of intra and inter-governmental debate over arms control. questions of purpose, if raised at all, rapidly assume the status of an irrelevance. Details are important, but their consideration should not be permitted to foreclose upon the trends they express and advance or retard. For example, in the ultimately mad momentum of arms control in the Reagan Administration, high officials forgot--or deemed

it expedient to forget--that a trend towards denuclearization is undesirable for Western security. In short, whether or not the double-zero of the 1987 INF treaty was well negotiated, and whether or not the subsequent regime will prove to be verifiable--the treaty does the wrong things for NATO. Similarly, by way of further illustration, it can be argued that the ABM treaty of 1972 does the wrong thing very well indeed (at least by way of restraining the United States).

These remarks suggest that the precise numbers and other details pertaining to candidate naval arms control treaties may matter a great deal less than the trends represented and forwarded by the treaties at issue. One may recall with profit the advice relevant to many human activities concerning the care that should be exercised over the setting of precedents.

Without prejudging negatively any proposal for naval arms control, it is only sensible for us to keep in the forefront of our minds understanding of the kind of seapower, broadly comprehended, and maritime strategy for the direction of that seapower, that the United States needs to maintain in support of her current national security policy. For many years to come the United States will continue to lead a truly global coalition whose lines of communication overwhelmingly are maritime. The pivot, or center of gravity of this global coalition, is the United States--a continental-size functionally insular superpower which, in principle, has choices as to where and how it should project military power overseas.

Given that this paper is designed to assist thinking about naval arms control, alternative national security concepts to on-shore containment of Soviet power in Eurasia will not be identified and appraised. What matters here is to advise as to the kind of maritime strength required by a U.S. superpower still committed to far forward and multilateral containment. By way of the tersest of illustrative summaries, U.S. naval power should have the characteristics of: global reach (with only minor exceptions pertaining to militarily effectively closed sea areas); great flexibility; an offensive striking power of major defensive value; being always at sea in large numbers; and a willingness to give battle under most circumstances. These are not just "nice to have" characteristics: they are qualities basic to superior seapower.

No arms control proposal should be dismissed peremptorily as an offense against the characteristics of superior seapower just cited. Any proposal which seems likely to, or certainly must, impair these qualities in U.S. seapower, however, would warrant very close scrutiny. Specifically, U.S. officials should be suspicious of naval arms control proposals that fair to: diminish the global domain of potential action by the U.S. Navy; reduce the flexibility of the U.S. Navy--be it the flexibility which derives from number of ships, from variety of ships, weapons, and equipment, or from scope for deployment; restrict severely the offensive reach, punch, or sustainability in action of the Navy; reduce markedly the ability of the Navy to keep its sea time high; and, finally, to have a net negative impact upon the willingness of the Navy to seek and offer battle (very small numbers could have this

deplorable effect, for example). None of these, considered in isolation, necessarily should be treated as a "killer" implication of naval arms control. Yet, when naval arms control proposals come to be assessed seriously, the assessors need to bear in mind the kind (and quantity) of seapower and quality of maritime strategy the country requires.

There are some important senses in which policy errors in the field of naval arms control could be almost uniquely damaging to national security. At some risk of giving offense, this paper must point out that arms control regimes for so-called central nuclear systems (i.e., the START arena) as well as for conventional armed forces in Europe (CFE), are non-serious in their prospective outcomes--if any--relative to the potential significance of naval arms control. Unlike the "strategic"-nuclear and conventional ground forces, U.S. naval forces actually are charged with winning their geostrategic dimension of a World War III (not to mention their obligation to win a variety of clashes in less dire circumstances). The central-strategic and European ground-forces' "balances" are considerably error-tolerant vis à vis Western arms control policy. After all, to repeat, NATO's ground and tactical air forces are not charged with the defeat of a Pact invasion, but only with the ensuring of a major war, the denial of a Soviet triumphal procession, in the interest of intra-war deterrence. Similarly, U.S. "strategic"-nuclear forces are so far from being able to wage and win a "central war," that a START agreement that is

disadvantageous at the margins to the United States will not matter very much.

For an insular power with initially unworkable land-oriented features to its strategy--i.e., NATO's "strategy" of a nuclear dependent flexible response, and ideas for the central nuclear coercion of a U.S.S.R. successful in a theater campaign--superior seapower can translate into the ability to recover from those early disasters that always beset maritime democracies. Remember Dunkirk, Greece, Crete, Bataan, Corregidor...and so on. The point of this argument is not to predict catastrophe for NATO on land in Europe, and still less to advance a mindless maximalist claim for Western seapower. Rather, the point here is to say that errors in the realm of arms control policy for the Navy (as for space, and for some of the same reasons) would occur in what may well be a very unforgiving framework. The critical strategic-enabling character of maritime power for the West, married to the fact of a relative slimness of numbers of key platforms, (compared to central-strategic, ground, or tactical air forces) makes for a non-permissive environment.

In short, if one were willing "to take chances for peace"--or some such formula--those chances would be better taken in the form of cuts at the margin in central-nuclear or ground/tactical air forces, than in naval forces. Whether or not this argument is found to be persuasive, it should serve to emphasize what can be called the strategy imperative. In the absence of a holistic understanding of future conflict and of the possible character and quantity of national or

coalition calls upon U.S. naval power, officials have no business designing or responding to proposals for naval arms control. Needless to add, perhaps, this injunction applies to all fields or sub-fields of arms control endeavor. The fact that this injunction, really truism, constantly is honored in the breach, does not make it any less true and neither does it absolve us from the duty of reaffirming the proper standard of behavior.

The Navy, the Nation, and Arms Control

Unfortunately, though certainly not irretrievably the U.S. Navy has acquired the reputation for a negative attitude towards naval arms control. In fact, the U.S. Navy's generic position is not "just say no," it is "not now." Some observers claim that the latter stance is merely bare cover for the former. The nub of the Navy's position has been stated thus by Vice Admiral Charles R. Larson:

Once a mutually agreed upon arms control regime for land forces has been established that enhances stability in Europe, then the Western allies can examine the possibility of limitations on naval forces as they would affect the European balance of military power.²³

As expressed, this is not a position in danger of being judged overly generous in favor of arms control possibilities. The position, however, is rich in prudence. To date in the nuclear era, the Navy generally has enjoyed a benign neglect at the hands of would-be arms controllers (with the exception of proposals bearing upon the SSBN force, which is not really naval in the traditional meaning of the term). Unlike the Dreadnoughts and Super Dreadnoughts of 1906-14 which

were believed widely, if imprecisely, to have played a key role in the slide to war in those years, the control of the force structure, armaments, and operating practices of the modern U.S. Navy has seemed to bear scarcely at all upon the course of U.S.-Soviet strategic relations. The roles of navies in a very nuclear age continues to be a subject that is considerably understudied and even less frequently comprehended.²⁴

The U.S. Navy today, unlike the U.S. Navy of the 1920's and 1930's, has no recent history of operating in a political environment pervaded by arms control proposals for its limitation or other constraint. The weapons closest to institutional self-definition by the U.S. Air Force have been variously menaced and assisted over a quarter century by shifting fashions in arms control philosophy. The U.S. Navy has had no such experience. Save nominally with reference to so-called forward-based systems (FBS), the force structure of most interest to the U.S. Navy--the attack carrier and its escorts--has not been a serious candidate for arms control surgery.

Without offering judgment as yet on this or that naval arms control proposal, it is important to recognize that the U.S. Navy is not in the habit of explaining why its favorite weapons should not be subject to arms control attention. Institutions devote little time defending positions that no one is attacking. Whether or not the U.S.S.R. is very serious in its recently oft-repeated demands for naval arms control discussions, those demands may score many more political points than they should, if only because the U.S. Navy lacks a

mature body of politically sophisticated argument that makes sound strategic points in a plausible manner to non-professional naval persons.

The Navy may be in some danger, analogically, of hanging all ten defendants, even though only seven or eight of them have had their guilt established beyond a reasonable doubt. (Better that two or three innocent arms control proposals should be killed, than that one or two really guilty proposals be permitted to run free.) For excellent reasons, the Navy's attitude to naval arms control appears to be founded on the reasoning that since the risks naval arms control might pose to the national security are medium-to-high, and since the strategic benefits are very uncertain, why take chances?

Without prejudice to the case for or against naval arms control in general, or any measures of such control in particular, it is important to distinguish between political and strategic impulses for arms control démarches. To be more specific, there may (or may not) be a strategic case for naval arms control, but that control should not be urged, let alone, pursued, as a vehicle for astrategic political objectives. By way of examples of political motivation, naval arms control may be endorsed and urged because:

- One is casting around for some defense area that might lend itself to dramatic, or dramatic-seeming, arms control treatment--in order to avoid being upstaged by Mikhail Gorbachev as arms control impresario;

- It seems unfair that the U.S.S.R. should self-demote its military standing on land as greatly as may be argued to be the case, while NATO yields little or nothing in its realm of traditional military excellence, at sea;
- It can look dramatic, while perhaps really having little impact, if one believes that current Western (and particularly U.S.) naval postures and probably plans would not yield much value for deterrence or defense.

Political messages in favor of international cooperation preferably should take the form of traditional diplomatic-style initiatives. That approach reflects the fact that security at root is a political and not a military-technical subject. If a desire to "say it with arms control" becomes politically too fashionable for policymakers to resist, however, at the least the arms control initiatives should not threaten to undermine the military confidence important for a sense of security. The hydra-headed arms control debate is replete with proposals, for example for very deep cuts in forces (strategic, land, naval, air), which are utterly innocent of strategic reasoning. In the face of less than strongly cogent demands for expansion of the so-called arms control process to include naval forces and deployments, it is tempting for officials to reply in kind. Demands or suggestions for naval arms control stemming from unfriendly organizations and persons, ceteris paribus have a way of triggering all-but-reflexive

defensive responses--one does not endeavor to reason with folk who self-evidently mean one ill.

At the present time, demands for the opening of an East-West arms control dialogue on naval subjects are more irritating and troublesome than pressing. It is much easier to batten down the hatches in the hope that the unwelcome subject of arms control will go away, than it is to think seriously about it. Also, there is always the danger that the apparently responsible path of careful study, let alone open dialogue, may help dignify the possibility of naval arms control and hence might function inadvertently as a self-fulfilling exercise. The balance of U.S. naval opinion probably is to the effect that the small risk that arms control measures of net benefit to the United States may pass unrecognized through a generically negative view of naval arms control, is well worth taking given the dangers that can repose in the subject. As a matter of political fact, not to mention national and sub-national institutional dignity, the United States cannot appear to be unwilling, or too fearful, to negotiate on arms control. The Kennedy-era cliché about the United States never negotiating out of fear, yet never fearing to negotiate, should be taken to heart.

The Navy need not shun the arms control process as a slippery slope--provided it has done its homework properly. A good part of the reason why the INF and prospective START arms control régimes are unsound is because the people who negotiated and passed authoritative political judgment upon them did not really understand

the relevant strategy arguments. If this should be true of some future treaty on naval arms control, the Navy would only have itself to blame. The history of arms control suggests that ignorance in high places does not preclude negotiations or agreements; rather such ignorance simply manifests itself in the poor quality of negotiations and agreements.

To summarize, it is important that the Navy should neither promote its own institutional interests at the expense of the much broader interests of the nation, nor be misperceived as doing such. These are no easy matters on which to perform adequately. After all, it is the duty of the Navy to sustain its own well-being as an institution for the national good; it is the responsibility of naval officers to ensure that the argument for a strong Navy is made and heard; yet, it is not the responsibility of the U.S. Navy to balance arms control proposals in the maritime realm against larger considerations.

It is not the responsibility of the U.S. Navy to play surrogate President. The CNO is expected to be the senior spokesman for the U.S. interest in naval power. The U.S. Navy is one of the military instruments of a grand strategy guided by policy. It is for the Navy to assess the implications of naval arms control proposals upon its ability to function with maritime strategy as national military strategy and policy may require. The Navy's ability to secure its objectives, both general and specific, is important for U.S. national security; but those objectives are only maritime means to national strategic and policy ends. It follows that one must beware of level-of-analysis traps.

Logically, there simply can never be a case of choice between the forwarding of a Navy and the forwarding of a truly national objective. The latter subsumes the former. To talk of possible conflict between Navy and national objectives would be as foolish as to talk of possible conflict between tactics and strategy. The very idea is absurd.

If a great institution of state such as the U.S. Navy (or Army, or Air Force) conducts what appears to be a parochial assessment of the merits in an arms control proposal, it is doing no more and no less than it should. After all, if the Navy will not, or is not permitted to, assay a naval arms control proposal for its probable naval implications, who will do that job for the country? The U.S. Navy should both be alert to arms control proposals that might actually ease its many burdens, and be prepared to tell the Navy-oriented truth about those proposals. It is not for the Navy to make overall judgments about naval strength vis à vis national military strategy, let alone vis à vis U.S. foreign policy and East-West relations. Indeed, the Chairman of the JCS, the Secretaries of Defense and State, the President and key legislators, can function competently in the making of national policy on arms control only if the several "parochial" institutional interests have "spoken truth to power" from the deck plates, the runways, the foxholes, and the silos.

It is entirely appropriate that the Navy should assess a naval arms control proposal in the light of what its forces are charged with being able to do. To perform such an exercise is to demand or to imply neither that the test of U.S. Navy objectives is the only test that

an arms control proposal needs to face, nor is it to require that such a test should be superior in its outcome over other tests of all kinds. No institution of state is trusted to be the final judge of the burdens it should carry for the country--which is why the joint and specified commanders and the armed services propose, but others at high levels as well as in a different branch of government, dispose.

Proposals for naval arms control, unlike proposals for the control of strategic-nuclear arms, easily could impinge upon the ability of a military instrument to function flexibly in time of general peace as a sufficient aid to U.S. diplomacy. The U.S. Navy would be inadequate were it unable to perform as required by national (and coalition) military strategy in a global war with the U.S.S.R. However, unlike ICBM's (and even unlike the F-111's and the B-52 force)--for an obvious example--the U.S. Government uses the Navy day-by-day and, almost as a rule, in time of crises. There is a permanent danger that in the interest of effecting some uncertain benign influence upon the prospects for general East-West conflict, arms control proposals that could be massively insensitive to the peacetime performance of the Navy might find political favor.

The U.S. Navy has to appraise ideas for naval arms control with reference to such general Navy objectives as: the ability to secure and use sea lines of communication (SLOC's); the ability to deny positive uses of SLOC's to an enemy; the ability to knit together a global maritime-connected (or disconnected!) coalition; and the ability to project power to and over hostile shores (or to threaten plausibly to do

so). At a somewhat more specific level, naval arms control proposals require assessment in terms of the following itemization of Navy objectives:

- Preserve freedom of the seas (this is always an objective of the dominant naval power, since it maximizes the prospects that such freedom can be denied to enemies in time of crisis and war);
- Preserve options to exercise a forward strategy (tactical circumstances permitting, it is a truth of very long standing that the proper place for a superior fleet is upon the coast of the enemy);
- Preserve the ability to menace Soviet SSBN's;
- Relieve the danger of the "first salvo" (a concern reflecting the general, if underappreciated, truth that the offense tends to be the stronger form of waging war at sea);
- Keep Soviet submarines away from the U.S. coastline (an enemy able to deploy close offshore might be able to trail U.S. SSBN's, could complicate wartime convoy assembly and routing--in the event that convoys were used--and could conduct ship to shore missile bombardment with very short times of flight. Implicit

is the notion that Soviet surface ships would not be used in such roles.);

- Collect intelligence (some arms control proposals, with their cooperative provisions, might even facilitate intelligence gathering);
- Keep U.S. SSBN's secure (this objective clearly implies unrestricted freedom of deployment--the Soviet perspective naturally is that of the weaker naval power and favors ASW exclusion zones in support of the idea of fortified sea bastion areas);
- Maintain a "balanced fleet" in order to preserve and enhance flexibility in maritime capabilities;
- Reduce the possibility, or effects, of technological, tactical, or operational surprise (it is a proposition of arms control theory in general--not merely pertaining to the naval world--that agreements can reduce uncertainty and promote beneficial predictability);
- Reduce the possibility of inadvertent conflict (rules of peaceable engagement and geographical separation are judged by some arms control proponents to minimize the danger of some real-life Navy captain playing-out, for example, the Richard Widmark role in The Bedford Incident);

- Minimize the danger of an enemy choosing to wage nuclear war at sea.

These objectives cannot comprise the totality of a conceptual framework for the assessment of ideas on naval arms control. The relative importance of the objectives can be assessed only within a strategic framework embracing all four of the geophysical environments for armed conflict. Yet, and this is an important qualification, it is both necessary and proper for the U.S. Navy to assess proposals for naval arms control with reference to these objectives (or close variants of them). The careful consideration of the quite strictly naval consequences of naval arms control cannot have meaning save with reference to the demands of U.S. high policy (e.g., to contain the Soviet empire on shore in Eurasia--or to cease to do so) and of U.S. national military strategy (e.g., to conduct a global protracted non-nuclear war in the event of a short-campaign defeat on the ground in Europe--or to escalate rapidly out of a deteriorating theater conflict to homeland to homeland nuclear coercion). If "the seat of purpose (for naval power and maritime strategy) is on the land," so must it be also for naval arms control. In other words, questions of naval arms control cannot be resolved wholly with reference to naval criteria, because those criteria have to lack a final authority in the holistic context of national and international security.

Some Proposals

Categorically, naval arms control proposals can be separated into four areas: confidence building measures, qualitative constraints, quantitative controls, and geographic or deployment limitations. The common wisdom has it that--depending on the details, of course--confidence building measures would be the easiest to attain in general, while for the U.S. Navy, deployment limitations would be the most difficult to accept.

Confidence Building Measures (CBMs)

These measures, variants of which have been adopted for ground forces by the Helsinki and Stockholm Conferences are generally thought of as fairly easy to agree upon and to implement, not very weighty in their impact, and modest in their intentions. They seek, in general, to improve mutual trust and confidence among states, and in particular to increase the predictability of military operations in peacetime, to complicate the task of planning a surprise attack, literally to help build political confidence, and, perhaps, to ease the ability to respond to warning indicators. CBMs can be assumed unilaterally, bilaterally, or multilaterally, and they can be global or regional. A United Nations study listed the following as possibilities for naval CBMs:

- Extension of existing confidence building measures to seas and oceans, especially to areas with the busiest sea lanes;

- Agreements not to expand naval activities in areas of tension or armed conflict;
- As a corollary to the above, withdrawal of foreign naval forces to specified distances from regions of tension or armed conflict;
- Agreements to forgo on a reciprocal basis some or all forms of naval deployment, activity and/or transit in a particular area;
- Restraints on the use of foreign naval bases;
- Restraints on the use of certain weapon systems;
- More openness between states concerning their naval strengths, activities and intentions, e.g. prior notification of and exchanges of information on naval exercises or manoeuvres or on major movements of naval, including amphibious, forces; the presence of observers during exercises or manoeuvres; notification of the passage of submarines, especially in regions of high international tension;
- International agreements to prevent incidents between naval forces on or over the high seas, similar to the existing US/USSR Agreement on the prevention of incidents on and over the high seas of 1972; and

- Measures related to the non-proliferation of certain technologies of maritime warfare.²⁵

The list reflects the fact that almost any restraint can qualify as a CBM, and that extensive overlap exists between CBMs and other forms of naval arms control. Unquestionably, it is in the interest of those who advocate naval arms control as a desirable goal (in exclusion of other considerations argued at length in this paper) to place geographic, qualitative, or quantitative restraints under the rubric of CBMs, seeking to imply that they are not very restrictive in their effect.

Since the latitude for christening a range of subjects "CBM" is wide, some clarifying questions must be asked: What is the point of the proposed CBM? In what is confidence to be built? Whose confidence benefits from the measure? and, Could confidence at the margin amidst a sea of uncertainty make a critical difference?

The impact of confidence building measures on the previously listed U.S. Navy Objectives is displayed in Table 1.

	Confidence building Measures
Preserve free- dom of the seas	●
Preserve for- ward strategy options	●
Keep Soviet subs away from CONUS	○
Relieve "first salvo" menace	○
Maintain fleet balance	
Keep U.S. SSBNs secure	○
Guard against technological or operational surprise	
Collect intelligence	○
Reduce possi- bility of inadver- tent conflict	○
Minimize dan- ger of nuclear war at sea	○
Preserve ability to threaten Soviet SSBNs	●

KEY	
○	= positive effect
●	= negative effect
□	= no or unknown effect

Table 1

The table is intended to offer a very broad net assessment of the general type of constraints on Navy objectives. It is wholly judgmental, entirely dependent to the perceptions of the observer. Should a consensus be reached, however, on what goes in each cell of the matrix, one can draw conclusions about the sensitivity of each of the objectives to different arms control measures, and also about the desirability of the various types of constraints. Each of the naval arms control measures will be arrayed against the objectives, and then a summary table will be provided.

Qualitative Constraints

For the most part, this type of constraint has the intention of preventing or restricting modernization of weapon systems. This type of constraint, moreover, is as a class more difficult to verify than the other types. The UN Report listed the following in this category:

- Limit dual-capable (nuclear/conventional) missiles;
- Introduction of devices to deactivate unexploded weapons;
- Neutralize, minimize, or ban emplacement of monitoring systems on sea-bed or ocean floor;
- Prohibit development and production of new SLBM systems; and

- Agreed controls on arms transfers and the transfer of technology for naval application.²⁶

Conceivable also might be limits to, reduction in, or prohibition of entire classes of new (or deployed) weapons, numbers of types of weapons (whether in the total inventory or deployed in naval platforms), or in the range of weapons. Here the United States might have an interest in imposing constraints on short range nuclear delivery systems capable of attacking ships, and the Soviet Union on longer-range nuclear delivery systems such as the land-attack nuclear version of the U.S. Tomahawk missile.

In this area, nuclear issues capture the spotlight and major interest. As usual, moreover, strategic geography tends to be trumps. Table 2 sets forth an assessment of this kind of constraint against the given set of U.S. Navy objectives.









	Qualitative Constraints
Preserve freedom of the seas	
Preserve forward strategy options	
Keep Soviet subs away from CONUS	
Relieve "first salvo" menace	
Maintain fleet balance	
Keep U.S. SSBNs secure	
Guard against technological or operational surprise	
Collect intelligence	
Reduce possibility of inadvertent conflict	
Minimize danger of nuclear war at sea	
Preserve ability to threaten Soviet SSBNs	

Table 2

Quantitative Constraints

These include not only constraints or limits, but also reductions on major naval platforms. The limitations may be mutual, reciprocal, and/or asymmetrical. They may also be asymmetrical among environments--e.g. sea for land, or air, etc. Limitations might apply to aggregate numbers of ships, specific types of ships, tonnage, manpower, or even to budgets. The UN Report says: "[Q]uantitative restraints should not be lightly discarded as they are the most direct means of limiting and reducing the competitive accumulation of arms." It then goes on to list the following:

- Freeze the manufacture of nuclear weapons [which obviously overlaps the qualitative category];
- Limit numbers of SLBM launchers and warheads;
- Limit introduction of new SLBM systems;
- Specific reductions in SLBM submarines and launchers;
- Prohibition or limitations on nuclear SLCM;
- Reductions in tactical nuclear weapons in numbers, by types, or by types of ship;
- Limit number of ships by main type;
- Limit amphibious capability.

Before the value or the implications of such controls can be estimated, some basic questions would have to be answered. For example: From where does the determination of the naval force structure of the candidate state for arms control emanate? Why is the navy the size, and why does it have the character it currently does? Could arms control intervene to change logical answers to these questions?

Table 3 contains an assessment of the general category of quantitative controls to the Navy Objectives postulated.

	Quantitative Constraints
Preserve freedom of the seas	●
Preserve forward strategy options	●
Keep Soviet subs away from CONUS	○
Relieve "first salvo" menace	○
Maintain fleet balance	●
Keep U.S. SSBNs secure	●
Guard against technological or operational surprise	●
Collect intelligence	
Reduce possibility of inadvertent conflict	
Minimize danger of nuclear war at sea	
Preserve ability to threaten Soviet SSBNs	●

Table 3

Geographic and/or Mission Constraints

The precedents for this type of arms control--like the others--are few. Cited have been the Rush-Bagot Treaty between the United States and Canada in 1817 and the Montreux Convention of 1936, the Parties to which are: Bulgaria, France, Great Britain, Australia, Greece, Japan, Rumania, Turkey, the U.S.S.R., and Yugoslavia. The U.N. report lists the following under this rubric:

- Ban transit / transport of nuclear weapons in international waters;
- Withdrawal of vessels with nuclear weapons from certain sea areas;
- Establish Nuclear Free Zones (NFZs);
- Prohibit transit of nuclear weapons through NFZs;
- Remove missile submarines from certain (extensive) areas of patrol, confine to agreed limits;
- Restrict naval activities to certain maritime zones;
- Restrict and lower the level of military activity and presence in appropriate regions;
- Prohibit establishing new and gradual elimination of existing foreign naval bases;

- Geographic limits on exercises and maneuvers.

More, perhaps, than the other types of limits, the inherent asymmetrical effects of geographic and mission constraints are rather easy to discern. States that do not have large, ocean-going fleets, or nuclear weapons in their ships, or that do not conduct large-scale exercises or deploy large segments of their forces far from their homeland need not be concerned about the effect of such limits. The role of the U.S. Navy as a global binding force for furthering U.S. interests and the interests of its allies stands out especially starkly in light of this list of possible controls. Table 4 indicates how such initiatives might stack up against U.S. Navy objectives, and it includes Tables 1-3 by way of summary.

	Quantitative limits	Qualitative limits	Deployment constraints	Confidence Building Measures
Preserve freedom of the seas	●	●	●	●
Preserve forward strategy options	●	●	●	●
Keep Soviet subs away from CONUS	○	○	○	○
Relieve "first salvo" menace	○	○	○	○
Maintain fleet balance	●			
Keep U.S. SSBNs secure	●		○	○
Guard against technological or operational surprise	●	●	○	
Collect intelligence			●	○
Reduce possibility of inadvertent conflict		○	○	○
Minimize danger of nuclear war at sea		○	○	○
Preserve ability to threaten Soviet SSBNs	●	●	●	●

KEY	
○	= positive effect
●	= negative effect
□	= no or unknown effect

Table 4

From the array in Table 4, one can draw the following conclusions: Arms control has the greatest potential for positive effect on these objectives:

- Keeping Soviet submarines away from CONUS;
- Relieving the threat of the "first salvo,"
- Reducing the possibility of inadvertent conflict; and
- Minimizing the danger of nuclear war at sea.

On the contrary, arms control contains the greatest potential for harm for the following:

- Preserving freedom of the seas;
- Preserving forward strategy options; and
- Preserving the ability to threaten Soviet SSBNs.

Thus, from the most positive to the most negative in across-the-board effect one finds first confidence building measures, then geographic or deployment constraints, then qualitative constraints, and finally quantitative constraints. It should be emphasized, however, that the cells in the matrix are of unequal value. So, although it permits some broad conclusions to be drawn, as has been so heavily emphasized earlier in the paper the specific context under which the constraints might apply is all-important. In sum, the matrix offers some insights, but it is far from a decisionmaking tool.²⁷

Conclusions

The objective of this effort has not been to provide a cookbook on naval arms control, but to draw the contours of ways to think about the subject. Accordingly, following concluding observations are offered:

- Naval arms control, like maritime strategy, the Navy, and seapower makes sense only in the context of the course of events on land. Accordingly, assessment of naval arms control, like assessment of naval power, must be holistic.
- There are many different levels of analysis for testing and for determining guidance on naval arms control policy:
 - National security objectives
 - Strategic objectives
 - Navy objectives
 - Common sense (is it equitable, verifiable, a "good" agreement, etc.)
- Strategic objectives tend to be the missing level of analysis: Why are we doing this? Are we better off with or without a treaty? How does "provision x" or "provision y" help us win (or avoid losing)? Etc.

- It is not for the U.S. Navy to agonize over the merit in Naval arms control proposals vis à vis other (political, land, air, etc.) considerations. We elect Presidents and they appoint Secretaries of Defense to help them worry about national-level, overall decisions.
- Narrowly navy-focussed studies of naval arms control--by U.S. Navy--are wholly appropriate. It is one of those situations where if the Navy does not do it someone else will do it for the Navy, and the Navy will be unprepared to respond.
- We often say--probably wrongly--that "the Devil is in the details" of arms control. In fact, the arms control process tends to lock us into the treatment of details (numbers, locations etc.) at the expense of considering trends. In thinking about naval arms control we should stress those characteristics of U.S. naval power that are desirable and be alert to arms control constraints that express or advance, trends that are undesirable (e.g., loss of flexibility, loss of sea access, and the like).
- Naval arms control is potentially more danger-fraught and a less fault-tolerant arms control environment for U.S./NATO than is CFE or START. The reasons are straightforward: the U.S. Navy has comparatively few

platforms, and the Navy is required to win. NATO ground and tactical air forces only have to put up a good fight to demonstrate our will to escalate; and past errors in strategic arms control have not been severely damaging to us--at least thus far.

- The U.S. Navy is actually used in peacetime statecraft as an important instrument of grand strategy. Strategic forces, tactical air forces, and even the Army, are not usually used. Therefore, arms control constraints focused upon their impact on a speculative World War III could materially damage our day-by-day use of the Navy.
- To evaluate the impact and the importance of a given naval arms control proposal, it would be useful to weigh the proposal against a list of Navy objectives. This would have the positive benefits of requiring a structured appraisal of the proposal in question, and, also, perhaps, of clarifying the Navy's objectives.

¹ On the relations among the different levels of analysis, see Edward N. Luttwak, Strategy: The Logic of War and Peace (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1987); and Colin S. Gray, Theories of Victory: Strategy, Statecraft, and War (New York: Simon and Schuster, forthcoming in 1990).

² What fairly may be called the RAND school of strategic analysis, has argued for nearly forty years that the fine print of strategic vulnerabilities--real, imaginary, and highly debatable and contingent--could be critically significant for policy decisions for peace or war. For the "founding study" see A. J. Wohlstetter *et al.*, Selection and Use of Strategic Air Bases, R-266 (Santa Monica, Cal.: Rand Corporation, April 1954). Fred Kaplan, Wizards of Armageddon (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1983), offers a penetrating critique.

³ See Patrick Glynn, "The Sarajevo Fallacy," The National Interest, No. 9 (Fall 1987), pp. 3-32.

⁴ For example, see the excellent discussion in J. R. Jones, "Limitations of British sea power in the French Wars, 1689-1815," in Jeremy Black and Philip Woodfine, eds., The British Navy and the Use of Naval Power in the Eighteenth Century (Leicester [U.K.]: Leicester University Press, 1988), pp. 33-49.

⁵ Carl von Clausewitz, On War (Michael Howard and Peter Paret, eds.) (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1976; first pub. 1832), Chapter 7.

⁶ See Wayne P. Hughes, Jr., Fleet Tactics: Theory and Practice (Annapolis, Md.: Naval Institute Press, 1986), pp. 33-34.

⁷ In particular see Thomas C. Schelling and Morton H. Halperin, Strategy and Arms Control (New York: Twentieth Century Fund, 1961).

⁸ See Sean M. Lynn-Jones, "Lulling and Stimulating Effects of Arms Control," in Albert Carnesale and Richard N. Haass, eds., Superpower Arms Control: Setting the Record Straight (Cambridge, Mass.: Ballinger Publishing Company, 1987), pp. 223-273.

⁹ An excellent treatment is William E. Odom, "The Kremlin's Strategy to De-Nuclearize NATO," Air Force Magazine, Vol. 72, No. 3 (March 1989), pp. 40-45.

¹⁰ Edward N. Luttwak, "An Emerging Postnuclear Era?" The Washington Quarterly, Vol. 11, No. 1 (Winter 1988), pp. 5-15.

¹¹ See Kenneth L. Adelman, "Arms Control With and Without Agreements," Foreign Affairs, Vol. 62, No. 2 (Winter 1984/85), pp. 240-263.

¹² See John Shy, "The American Military Experience: History and Learning," Journal of Interdisciplinary History, 1 (Winter 1971), pp. 205-228.

¹³ George C. Wilson, "Bush Halved Proposal To Cut Forces," The Washington Post, June 11, 1989, p. 1.

¹⁴ See Colin S. Gray, "U.S. Strategic Culture: Implications for Defense Technology," in Asa A. Clark IV and John F. Lilley, eds., Defense Technology (New York: Praeger, 1989), pp. 31-48.

¹⁵ See Leon Sloss and M. Scott Davis, A Game for High Stakes: Lessons Learned in Negotiating with the Soviet Union (Cambridge, Mass.: Ballinger Publishing Company, 1986).

¹⁶ Mikhail Gorbachev, Perestroika: New Thinking for Our Country and the World, New, Updated Edition (New York: Harper and Row, Publishers, 1988) pp. 91-95.

¹⁷ Report of the President's Commission on Strategic Forces, April 6, 1983, p. 3.

¹⁸ Christopher Donnelly, Red Banner: The Soviet Military System in Peace and War (Coulson, Surrey: Janes Information Group, LTD, 1988) p. 31.

¹⁹ Colin S. Gray, "People, Not Weapons, Make War," Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, Vol 45, #4, May 1989, p. 34.

²⁰ See, for example, Michael Howard, The Causes of Wars (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1984) and Geoffrey Blainey, The Causes of War (New York: The Free Press, 1973).

²¹ Edward N. Luttwak, Strategy: The Logic of War and Peace (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1987), especially Part I.

²² Sun Tzu, The Art of War, Translated by Samuel B. Griffith (London: Oxford University Press, 1963, p.84.

²³ Prepared Statement on Naval Arms Control, Vice Admiral Charles R. Larson before the Seapower Subcommittee of the House Armed Services Committee, 1989, p. 6. Emphasis added.

²⁴ In which respect see Colin S. Gray, Competitive Grand Strategies and the Roles of the Navy (Fairfax, Va.: National Security Research, January 1989).

²⁵ United Nations, General Assembly. General and Complete Disarmament: Study on the Naval Arms Race. Report of the Secretary General, A/40/535, September 17, 1985, p. 83. The "Group of Governmental Experts" who carried out the study were: Mr. Ali Alatas, Indonesia; Mr. Hervé Coutau-Bégarie, France; Mr. Deng San Rui, China; Mr. Minko-Mi-Endamne, Gabon; Mr. Jorge Morelli-Pando, Peru; Mr. Jan Prawitz, Sweden; and Mr. Jan Hendrik van Rede, the Netherlands. It is important to note that there are only two first-rank navies in the world today, and only two upon which most of the constraints would apply. Neither of them was represented among the "Group of Governmental Experts."

²⁶ Ibid., p. 80.

²⁷ It should come as no surprise that the Soviet Union, especially in the past several years, has endorsed naval arms control measures that include each of the four categories of limitation. Typical of the Soviet approach of late is the following quotation from an article by Colonel General Chervov of the Soviet General Staff: "Regrettably, neither the United States nor NATO wants to reduce navies. Equally disturbing is their insistence that navies have not been included in the

agenda [of the Conventional Forces talks]. Meanwhile, the naval role in the balance of forces will increase as reductions in conventional forces proceed. Having a fivefold superiority in surface ships and an almost 12-to-1 advantage in surface ships with cruise missiles, and taking into account cuts in land forces, NATO will secure a dangerous naval superiority. Therefore, talks reducing naval power should be started immediately and confidence-building measures should be extended to them." Nikolai Chervov, "NATO Must Bend During Arms Talks," Defense News, April 3, 1989, p. 20.